I Introduction
It is nowadays broadly accepted that the universal value and application of international human rights norms does not imply a uniform implementation of these rights, thereby leaving room for local and culture specific implementation at the national level. The question remains, however, what the precise scope of that room is or should be. A common criticism of allowing for cultural diversity in the implementation of international human rights law is that it leads to relativism and to a lack of sufficient clarity and predictability of the norms, undermining legal certainty as constitutive element of the rule of law. It could however also be argued that a certain amount of flexibility allowing for cultural diversity is inherent in the international legal human rights system and is not detrimental to legal certainty. First, we introduce the concepts of cultural diversity and legal certainty (Section II). Then we provide an overview of the substantive issues of cultural diversity that come to the fore in the implementation of ICEDAW (Section III). We then analyse how these issues generate the practice of a dialogue in the state reporting procedure and the individual complaints procedure of the CEDAW, and how such a dialogue affects the meaning of conventional rights and the room for the culture-specific implementation (Section IV). We end with concluding remarks on the role of dialogue in mediating cultural diversity and legal certainty (Section V).
II Two Conceptual Issues on Cultural Diversity in International Human Rights Law

A Universality and Cultural Diversity
Cultural diversity is defined in article 2 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions as referring to 'the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find expression. These expressions are passed on within and among groups and societies…'. 1 In this chapter, cultural diversity denotes the factual situation of cultural differences existing between and within states, whereby the term 'cultural' can refer to many things, including ethnicity, history, language, religion, customs etc. 2 Cultural diversity can operate at different levels: between states, regions, communities and individuals, but also within states, regions and communities.
Human rights and cultural diversity have been discussed extensively in the context of the universalism and cultural relativism debate. 3 In an attempt to reconcile both universalism and cultural relativism, the predominant view now suggests that respect for cultural diversity can very well be consistent with the notion of the universality of human rights. 4 Cultural relativism and universality do not have to mutually exclude each other if the former is understood as respect for cultural diversity as opposed to a challenge to the legitimacy of international human rights norms. The dichotomy can be overcome for instance by making a distinction between universality of the subjects to whom international human rights norms apply (beneficiaries) and universality of the normative content of the norms.
implemented in a uniform way, thereby leaving room for variation at national level.
This process is monitored by international monitoring bodies.
B Legal Certainty
Legal certainty is often considered as one of the central elements of the rule of law, which is mainly developed at national level. 11 Legal certainty serves to provide individuals with a predictable environment, which guides them in complying with the law and protects them from arbitrary government action by controlling government power to make and apply the law. Legal certainty concerns how the law is made, how it is interpreted and how it is applied. 12 According to the European Court of Human Rights, legal certainty, in particular the aspect of foreseeability, '…requires that all law be sufficiently precise to allow the person -if need be, with appropriate advice -to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail'. 13 Consequently, laws and decisions must be made public, they must be definite and clear and retroactivity of laws and decisions must be strictly limited.
14 It is sometimes argued that legal certainty prevents flexibility, which would be necessary for laws to function. For instance, courts must have a certain amount of freedom to interpret and apply a norm in a particular case. Others maintain that the law 11 Jeremy Waldron, 'The Rule of International Law ' (2006) The equality principle however also implies the right to be different, in other words, the ICEDAW also creates obligations of states to recognise the special situation of certain groups of women and to take special measures to sustain diversity. This follows from the recognition that respect for cultural differences can be fully in line with the principle of equality. Having equal rights is not the same as being treated equally. Indeed, equality and non-discrimination not only imply that equal situations should be treated equally, but also that unequal situations should be treated unequally.
At the international level, it was understood that 'the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing…does not mean identical treatment in every instance'. 
B Cultural Stereotypes, Attitudes and Practices
The CEDAW has on many occasions expressed its concern about cultural or traditional stereotypes, attitudes and practices that determine the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and society and that may pose obstacles to the enjoyment of the rights or cause violations of these rights. This concern is linked to Article 5(a) 30 Legal doctrine generally distinguishes between differentiation, distinction and discrimination. Differentiation is difference in treatment that is lawful; distinction is a neutral term which is used when it has not yet been determined whether difference in treatment is lawful or not; and discrimination is difference in treatment that is arbitrary and unlawful. Consequently status and needs of women in that country and take into account any ethnic, regional or community variations or practices based on religion, tradition or culture'.
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Cultural considerations further play an important role in marriage and family relations. The dissolution of marriage, inheritance, property rights, custody and guardianship of children are often subject to customary and religious laws and practices.
Acknowledging that there are various forms and concepts of the family between and within states, the Committee submits that '…whatever the legal system, religion, custom or tradition within the country, the treatment of women in the family both at law and in private must accord with the principles of equality and justice for all people'.
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The Committee further notes the potential difference between laws and practice:
'…while most countries report that national constitutions and laws comply with the Convention, custom, tradition and failure to enforce these laws in reality contravene the Convention'.
53
There are cultural practices in relation to marriage that are problematic from a human rights perspective, such as early and forced marriage, levirate, bride price (dowry), or polygamy. The Committee often expresses concerns about the prevalence of traditional stereotypes of women in relation to their role in the family, 54 or discriminatory legal provisions and negative customary practices related to marriage and family relations, which reflects the lack of advancement of the status of women in the society. 55 In its General Recommendation on equality in marriage and family relations the Committee, for instance '…notes with concern that some States parties, whose constitutions guarantee equal rights, permit polygamous marriage in accordance with personal or customary law'. It considers this a violation of women's rights, in particular of article 5(a) of the Convention. 56 As regards the division of marital property, the Committee argues that '…any discrimination in the division of property that rests on the premise that the man alone is responsible for the support of the women and children 51 states to adopt education and information programmes which will help eliminate prejudices and change attitudes concerning the roles and status of men and women. 67 When discussing employment, a repeated concern is occupational segregation, with women taking up low-paid traditional jobs and part-time work, often due to their parallel traditional role of caregivers for children and the elderly. 68 In some countries, when women get married, they tend to become exclusively responsible for care work. 69 Certain vulnerable groups, in particular from minority communities, may be excluded from the formal labour market, 70 or suffer from segregation into lower quality jobs, based on stereotypes related to gender, race and ethnicity. 71 These examples show that, at least when it comes to the implementation of the ICEDAW, culture is not the flexibility tool that it is sometimes held out to be. The
Committee is very critical of cultural arguments that undermine the working of the treaty. It seems that it broadly prefers a universality approach over a flexibility approach.
It should, however, be noted that the analysis above is based on issues that were raised After the Committee has adopted its Views, the state party is requested to submit, within six months, a written response including information on the action taken following the Committee's recommendations. One member of the Committee is appointed as rapporteur for follow-up on Views. The Committee periodically decides whether further action is required and until the case is closed it reports to the General
Assembly that 'the dialogue is on-going'. 90 Although the meetings that rapporteurs on follow-up have with states parties is considered as some form of continuing dialogue between the Committee and the state party, it should be noted that this dialogue takes place only after the View has been adopted. This means that the treaty norm interpretation (and thus the development of the general jurisprudence) has already been shaped.
The practice and experience of the Committee is laid down in General
Recommendations, in which it comments on specific treaty provisions or elaborates on the relationship between the Convention and specific themes or issues. 91 States parties play a limited and more indirect role in the adoption of these Recommendations. They are drafted and adopted by consensus by the Committee, whereby states parties are invited to comment on the draft text. 102 In its seventh periodic report, Kenya conceded that 'one of the biggest challenges to women's equality with men on matters concerning marriage and the family is cultural construction of women's roles vis-à-vis that of men, cultural attitudes and belief about women and their traditional roles, which lead to women's subjugation and, in many cases, retrogressive cultural practices', 103 and submitted that measures were being taken for modification of social and cultural patterns of conduct. 104 In the subsequent Concluding Observations, the Committee, 'while noting some efforts made by the state party', reiterated its concerns. 105 In the dialogue with Bangladesh, the Committee expressed concern that 'strong stereotypical attitudes persist with respect to the roles and responsibilities of women in the family and society, negatively affecting women's enjoyment of their rights and impeding the full implementation of the Convention'. 106 Bangladesh reported that it had been implementing 'programs that include awareness raising activities to change stereotype attitude and norms about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and society' 107 and carried out 'activities as measures to address sex roles and stereotyping towards eliminating prejudices and biases'. 108 In the Concluding Observations, the Committee recognised the state party's efforts to promote changes in the stereotypical roles of women, but nevertheless, expressed its remaining concern. In several cases, the state party accepted the Committee's concerns, but argued to face obstacles or resistance in addressing these concerns. For example, in the dialogue with Indonesia, the Committee expressed concerns about the persistence of entrenched patriarchal attitudes and stereotypes about the roles and responsibilities of women and men in the family and society. Indonesia, although sharing these concerns, argued that 'values and cultural practices, especially when framed in a justification stemming from narrow religious interpretations, are difficult to address', and observed that a common understanding, also among policy makers, is often difficult to achieve. In the dialogue with Tunisia, the Committee asked to provide information on steps taken to ensure equality between women and men in matters of personal status, among others regarding dowry (Article 16 of the Convention). 126 Tunisia explained that 118 Ibid, para 118. 'While noting the efforts of the State party to reduce the value of the dowry to one dinar, the Committee is concerned that it remains a condition for the validity of the marriage'. 128 The Committee urged Tunisia to amend without delay discriminatory provisions or regulations relating to dowry.
129
The dialogue between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Committee dealt among other things with equality between women and men in respect to inheritance.
The UAE submitted in their report to CEDAW that 'the Personal Status Act includes provisions governing questions of (..) inheritance. The sharia is the basic source for the provisions of the Act, inasmuch as it relates to matters clearly spelled out by the religion concerning which no debate is permissible'. 130 It further explained that 'with respect to the distribution of inheritance, the provisions of the Islamic sharia are the principle reference'. 131 Acknowledging that different shares are allocated to male and female inheritors, it argued that gender was not the dictating factor, but the financial burden which in accordance with the sharia is placed on the inheritor to fulfil the responsibilities towards others. 132 The UAE further defended this practice, arguing that the differentiation does not lead to any wrong or unfairness towards the female, as follows: '…it is a man's responsibility to support the female, his wife and his children, whereas a female inheritor has in her brother someone who must support her and her children, she receives less than her brother, who receives twice as much as she does, but is more fortunate in respect of the inheritance because she is not obliged to support anyone else: that money is hers alone and is intended to provide a form of insurance for her'. 133 In the Concluding Observations, the Committee, nevertheless noted with concern that the legal provisions relating to personal status, including inheritance, in particular under the Personal Status Act, do not provide for equal rights of women and men. It called upon the UAE to introduce legislative reforms to provide women with equal rights in the field of inheritance. for review are those where culture functioned as an underlying cause of discrimination, or was considered discriminatory in itself.
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In all selected cases Article 5, containing the elimination of prejudices, stereotypes and traditional attitudes that are discriminatory towards women, was invoked. 145 The cases concern diverse contexts. For example, in a rape case against the Philippines, the domestic court's decision was found to be grounded in gender-based culture that should change, not the interpretation of the (scope of the) norms or obligations of states parties.
In the determination of the room for cultural diversity, the Committee mainly relies on its own understanding of the specific content of the norms, in which states parties play a very limited role. Others have already observed that the dialogue between treaty bodies and states parties often reflects the Committee's understanding of the specific content of rights, whereby states are pressed to explain practices. 165 The present analysis, especially in the context of the state reporting procedure, 166 supports this observation. It shows that the Committee's interpretation of the content of the rights hardly depends on an understanding resulting from the dialogue with states parties. The
Committee rather follows its own, independent, understanding.
In the practice of CEDAW, limited constructive interaction with the states parties takes place. Other than (sometimes) 'noting' or 'welcoming' some efforts by the state party, the Committee and the state party do not fully engage in a two-way dialogue; the Committee for instance neither motivates its observations nor shares its reasoning. Arguably, this has implications for the acceptability of the procedure and its
outcome, or what was called substantive legal certainty. While the Committee, to some extent, succeeds in contributing to formal legal certainty by creating predictability and commonality in its interpretation of treaty norms, the lack of a real dialogue implies that the interpretation of treaty norms by the Committee may not always be acceptable to states. It seems that the Committee mainly promotes formal legal certainty, even to the extent that it may be at the expense of substantive legal certainty. States who now demonstrate a willing and constructive attitude in the reporting procedure, and use the opportunity to explain their cultural beliefs and practices in relation to the CEDAW norms, may become frustrated by the lack of motivation on the side of the Committee.
This could eventually cause States to refuse to engage in a dialogue.
In order to promote the acceptability of its work, the CEDAW should not only 
